Detailed breakdown of current scores with supporting evidence
Last updated: July 16, 2026
100 — Conventional capacity effectively destroyed: navy assessed inoperable, missile/drone forces reduced ~90% or more, airspace uncontested with nationwide strikes proceeding at will; remaining responses are largely symbolic or asymmetric and cannot restore deterrence.
75 — Broad structural loss: most fixed launchers and naval assets destroyed, launch rates down more than 75%, top-command decapitation and frontline logistics failures; retaliation still occurs but is episodic and shrinking.
50 — Sustained degradation: major losses in at least one branch (e.g., navy or air defense), missile launch rates visibly falling, some senior commanders killed, yet coordinated multi-front operations remain routine.
25 — Limited attrition: isolated strikes degrade specific systems, but Iran retains credible deterrence, most launchers and stockpiles, contested airspace, and unbroken command continuity.
0 — Armed forces fully intact: air defense, missile forces, navy and command structure operate at pre-war capacity, with no meaningful attrition of leadership, launchers or stockpiles.
This pillar scores loyalty and willingness to obey and repress — not raw military capability. Command losses from enemy strikes score under Military Degradation; authorized devolution to provincial commands is adaptation, not disloyalty.
100 — IRGC, Artesh, Basij, police and intelligence services operate under unified command at full strength; no verified desertions, defections or purges; leadership succession uncontested and elite discipline maintained without visible coercion.
75 — Isolated desertions or defections and some factional grumbling, but the chain of command, reserve mobilization and coordinated operations remain reliable; loyalty rests mostly on consent rather than threat.
50 — Sustained absenteeism and unit-level desertions; inter-service rifts (e.g., IRGC-Artesh) confirmed; loyalty increasingly enforced by threat of prison or execution; command still executes major operations but force regeneration is failing.
25 — Group desertions and institutional defections; decapitated senior command layers refilled by coerced or improvised appointments; open factional confrontation among elites; the apparatus retains coordinated strike capability but can no longer secure regime rituals or fully control territory.
0 — Mass refusal of orders, unit disintegration or side-switching; security forces unwilling or unable to suppress mobilization; command-and-control collapses or fragments into rival armed factions.
100 — Fiscal-economic collapse: trade and oil exports effectively severed (e.g., Hormuz closed), the currency in free fall, the state unable to meet payroll or subsidy obligations, and a nationwide ration economy — economic function cannot recover without political change.
75 — Breakdown dynamics: staple prices doubling within months, nationwide rationing of food, fuel or medicine, main export channels largely severed, credible reports the state is struggling to pay salaries, and sustained economic strikes.
50 — Acute crisis: inflation above ~50% or a rapidly sliding currency, visible shortages or localized rationing of some staples, significant disruption to oil exports, and scattered economically driven protests or strikes.
25 — Chronic strain: elevated inflation (~20-40%), gradual currency depreciation, and sanctions friction, but staples remain available, export channels function, and the state meets its fiscal obligations.
0 — Macroeconomic normalcy: inflation below ~10%, a stable currency, oil exports and trade flowing unimpeded, state salaries and subsidies paid on time, and no shortages of staple goods.
100 — Mass uprising with millions in the streets, a general strike paralyzing the economy, regime symbols and ceremonies overtaken by crowds, and security forces unable or unwilling to disperse them.
75 — Sustained nationwide mobilization across classes and regions — simultaneous protests in 15+ cities, rolling strikes, and organized resistance networks conducting regular operations that suppression fails to stop from recurring.
50 — Recurring multi-city protests and sectoral strikes (workers, students, bazaar) with identifiable organization and political slogans, but crackdowns still restore control within days.
25 — Scattered, localized protests over economic grievances that disperse within hours; opposition activity confined to online spaces and diaspora rallies, with no cross-city coordination.
0 — No visible dissent: streets quiet, no strikes or organized opposition activity, and regime events draw crowds without coercion.
100 — Existential assault: great-power war explicitly or implicitly aimed at regime change, ground intervention underway or imminent, a full blockade, a unified hostile regional coalition, and no ally able or willing to intervene decisively.
75 — Open conflict: repeated foreign strike campaigns on military and economic targets, blockade or corridor closures choking trade, the region aligned against the regime, and external backing that is material but not decisive.
50 — Serious coercion: sustained maximum-pressure sanctions plus episodic strikes or covert operations; key trade corridors intermittently disrupted; diplomacy stalled but off-ramps remain open.
25 — Limited pressure: targeted sanctions and diplomatic isolation but no kinetic action; regional relations stable; great-power patrons (Russia/China) reliably offset Western pressure.
0 — Benign environment: no foreign military action or credible threat, sanctions lifted or waived, normal diplomatic and trade relations, and major powers invested in the regime's stability.
100 — State broadcasting reaches the whole country uncontested, the leadership appears live at will, censorship and internet controls suppress rival narratives, and no significant anti-regime content circulates domestically.
75 — Regime dominates the domestic narrative but visible cracks exist — VPN-enabled dissent, occasional viral counter-narratives, some events reported first by outside media; leadership appearances remain routine.
50 — Contested information space — state media and opposition/diaspora outlets compete on roughly even terms inside Iran; the regime resorts to sustained throttling or blackouts; leadership communications are sporadic or scripted.
25 — Regime is largely reactive — key events (deaths, defeats, succession disputes) reach the public through hostile channels first; state broadcasting is degraded; the leadership avoids live appearances; blackouts fail to stop leaks.
0 — Narrative control fully collapsed — state broadcast capacity destroyed or ignored, the leader cannot appear in public at all, official ceremonies are hijacked by opposition messaging, and even total blackouts cannot contain anti-regime content.
100 — Leadership responds coherently to shocks: a clear chain of command makes credible policy pivots (negotiating or conceding when needed), the state pays salaries and delivers services on time, and succession mechanisms operate without visible dispute.
75 — Adaptation is slower and costlier but real: the regime executes tactical retreats and negotiated deals under pressure, factional friction is visible but contained, and core services and salaries continue with strain.
50 — Adaptation is intermittent: deals get struck but then broken, leadership sends contradictory signals, some institutions improvise workarounds while others freeze, and service delivery or state payments partially fail under stress.
25 — Rigidity dominates: the regime defaults to self-harming escalation, rejects or squanders available exit ramps, top leadership is paralyzed or invisible, factions clash openly over policy, and basic governance functions (payrolls, bread, fuel) are visibly failing.
0 — No adaptive response left: no functioning decision-making center or credible negotiation channel, succession broken, institutions cannot pay salaries or keep food and fuel flowing, and the regime can only repeat moves that accelerate its own collapse.
The January 2026 massacre killed at least 32,000 civilians. This is based on Iran International reporting and regional hospital data. The regime's internet blackout was designed to prevent documentation. This mass killing fundamentally altered Security Apparatus Cohesion (SAC), Information Control (INC), and Regime Adaptive Capacity (RAC) scores.